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JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL DISTRICT — WESTERN DIVISION

RESHMA KAMATH,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUDITH ASHMAN-GERTZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 8:23-cv-02193-SVW-SSC  
Judge: Hon. Stephen V. Wilson

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF  
MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST  
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Date: June 3, 2024  
Time: 1:30 p.m.  
Courtroom: First Street Courthouse  
350 W. First Street  
Courtroom 10A, 10<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

MEM. OF P.&A. IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO  
DISMISS FIRST AM. COMPL.  
8:23-CV-02193-SVW-SSC

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The Judicial Defendants<sup>1</sup> respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Reshma Kamath (“Kamath”) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

I.

## **INTRODUCTION**

This action principally arises out of the imposition of sanctions against Kamath, a licensed California attorney, based on her egregious conduct in two appeals heard in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District (“Court of Appeal” or “Second Appellate District”). *See Schwartzman v. South Coast Tax Resolution, Inc.*, Case Nos. B314770, B320410, 2023 WL 7969843, at \*7-11 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2023); *Czech v. Herrera*, Case No. B316020, 2023 WL 7968410, at \*4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2023). Both opinions and sanctions orders were authored by Justice Ashmann-Gerst with Justice Lui concurring.

In *Schwartzman*, the Court of Appeal observed that “[f]or over two years, Kamath has persisted in a troubling pattern of behavior in which, from the moment she is given an indication that things may not pan out for her client, she unleashes a flood of unsupported claims of bias in an attempt to disqualify the presiding tribunal and delay any potential adverse rulings.” 2023 WL 7969843, at \*10. To support the imposition of sanctions, the court found that “Kamath’s conduct is not becoming of

<sup>1</sup> The Judicial Defendants consist of Defendants (1) the Honorable Maria E. Stratton, Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, (2) the Honorable Elwood G. Lui, Administrative Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, (3) the Honorable Judith Ashmann-Gerst, Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, (4) Melissa Real, Deputy Clerk of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, (5) the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, (6) the Honorable Michael J. Shultz, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, (7) the Honorable Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, (8) the Honorable Rolf M. Treu, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Ret.), (9) the Honorable William D. Stewart, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Ret.), (10) the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, and (11) the Judicial Council of California.

1 an attorney[,]” and that “[b]y turning her client’s case into a showcase for her  
 2 conspiracies of personal persecution, Kamath has done a disservice to [her client]  
 3 and to the courts.” *Id.* at \*11.

4 In *Czech*, in response to a motion to dismiss the appeal, “Kamath filed an  
 5 opposition … that leveled outrageous comments against the judiciary and Presiding  
 6 Justice Lui, prompting [the Court of Appeal] to notify the State Bar of her behavior.”  
 7 2023 WL 7968410, at \*5. “Even after [the court] issued an order notifying the parties  
 8 that Kamath’s opposition was being forwarded to the State Bar, Kamath persisted in  
 9 raising unfounded and offensive accusations against th[e] court.” *Id.* The Court of  
 10 Appeal accordingly held “Kamath is subjected to monetary sanctions payable to the  
 11 court for her relentless offensive filings and communications (as well as attempted  
 12 communications that have now been blocked).” *Id.*

13 Kamath thereafter filed the instant action in an apparent effort to continue her  
 14 offensive and baseless accusations of bias against the judiciary. The original  
 15 complaint alleged that Justices Ashmann-Gerst and Lui, along with Justice Stratton  
 16 and Deputy Clerk Melissa Real, “displayed racial discrimination and misogyny  
 17 towards [Kamath].” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 9-12; *see also id.* ¶ 18 [alleging Second Appellate  
 18 District “has demonstrated racism and gender discrimination in their practices,  
 19 conduct, and lack thereof …”].) Real is a deputy clerk in the Second Appellate  
 20 District who handled filings in *Schwartzman* and *Czech*, while Justice Stratton is  
 21 alleged to have issued a ruling in another matter mirroring language used in the  
 22 opinions issued in *Schwartzman* and *Czech*.

23 Kamath has since filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) totaling 100  
 24 pages and containing 500 paragraphs. (Dkt. No. 15.) The FAC makes the same  
 25 outrageous accusations against Justices Ashmann-Gerst, Lui, and Stratton, Deputy  
 26 Clerk Real, and the Second Appellate District. (*Id.* ¶¶ 129-132, 138.) The FAC also  
 27 adds new, baseless allegations of bias and racism against Judge Meiers, (*id.* ¶¶ 15,  
 28 115), who presided over proceedings in the trial court in *Schwartzman* and about

1 whom Kamath made numerous “disturbing” and “negative comments.” 2023 WL  
2 7969843 at \*2. The FAC also names as defendants other judges of the Superior Court  
3 of California, County of Los Angeles (“Superior Court”), namely Judge Shultz and  
4 retired Judges Treu and Stewart, the Superior Court itself, and the Judicial Council  
5 of California (“JCC”).<sup>2</sup> (*Id.* ¶¶ 15, 27-38, 41, 57-80, 87-90, 94-96, 116-118.) The  
6 FAC asserts 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims against the Judicial Defendants for  
7 alleged racial and gender discrimination, (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 226-236, 338-366), and  
8 various state law claims, including negligence, negligent hiring, and defamation. (*Id.*  
9 ¶¶ 212-225, 237-339, 367-495.) The FAC seeks damages in excess of \$100 million  
10 and injunctive and declaratory relief concerning the past actions of the Judicial  
11 Defendants. (*Id.* Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-3.)<sup>3</sup>

12 The instant action is subject to dismissal on multiple grounds. First, the FAC  
13 does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it fails to contain a  
14 short and plain statement of Kamath’s claims. Second, with the exception of Deputy  
15 Clerk Real, the action against the Judicial Defendants is foreclosed by judicial  
16 immunity, which prohibits claims against judicial officers arising out of judicial acts  
17

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18 <sup>2</sup> Such claims were previously raised in a separate action filed by Kamath in this  
19 District in October 2023. In that action, Kamath unsuccessfully moved to disqualify  
20 District Judge John F. Walter and Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow on the basis  
21 that “both are ‘presumably White, Male Individuals’ and, as a result, are likely to be  
22 biased in reviewing the race-and gender-based claims [Kamath] asserts in th[e]  
23 action.” *Kamath v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles*, Case No.  
24 LA CV23-08979 JFW (DTBx), 2023 WL 9419160, at \*1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2023)  
25 (Kronstadt, J.). The court appropriately denied Kamath’s motion, reasoning that “[a]  
26 suggestion that a judge cannot administer the law fairly because of the judge’s racial  
27 and ethnic heritage is extremely serious and should not be made without a factual  
28 foundation going well beyond the judge’s membership in a particular racial or ethnic  
group.” 2023 WL 9419160, at \*2. In what can only be characterized as judge-  
shopping, Kamath dismissed the action without prejudice and added the claims raised  
therein to her FAC. (See L.R. 41-4, 83-1.2.2.)

29 <sup>3</sup> Kamath’s practice of suing judges is not limited to state court judges or this  
30 District. In an action in the Northern District of California, District Judge William  
31 Alsup held Kamath in civil contempt for failure to comply with orders directing her  
32 to pay sanctions. *Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech Inc.*, Case No. C 20-  
33 04808 WHA, 2023 WL 7555284, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2023). Kamath responded  
34 by filing an action against Judge Alsup and his clerk asserting similar claims of  
35 discrimination as those alleged in this action. See *Kamath v. Muelman, et al.*, N.D.  
36 Cal. Case No. 5:23-cv-6494-PCP.

1 within their jurisdiction. Third, the action against Deputy Clerk Real is barred by  
2 quasi-judicial immunity, which prohibits claims against court clerks for tasks that are  
3 an integral part of the judicial process. Fourth, Kamath’s claims are precluded by the  
4 Eleventh Amendment, which precludes suits for damages, injunctive relief, and  
5 declaratory relief against the JCC, California courts, and state court judges and  
6 employees sued in their official capacities. Fifth, the action is prohibited by the  
7 *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, which prevents federal courts from hearing de facto  
8 appeals of state court decisions. Finally, the state law damages claims are unavailing  
9 because the FAC fails to allege compliance with California’s Government Claims  
10 Act, under which Kamath was required to present a government claim. The Court  
11 should therefore dismiss the action against the Judicial Defendants without leave to  
12 amend.

II.

## **LEGAL STANDARD**

15       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move to  
16 dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Because federal  
17 courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “a federal court is presumed to lack  
18 jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” *Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes*, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). A party who brings  
19 a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings or by  
20 presenting extrinsic evidence. *See White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).  
21 In the former, “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are  
22 insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” *Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

25 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a  
26 challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. A dismissal  
27 is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal  
28 theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”

1      *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A Rule  
2      12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim may also challenge defenses disclosed on  
3      the face of the complaint or which are apparent from matters subject to judicial  
4      notice. *Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles*, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997);  
5      *MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman*, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986); *Mack v. South*  
6      *Bay Beer Distributors, Inc.*, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), *overruled on other*  
7      *grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino*, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).

8              Courts evaluate whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory or  
9      sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires “a  
10     short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  
11     *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Each allegation in a complaint also  
12     must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 nevertheless  
13     requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient specificity to “give the  
14     defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”  
15     *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted);  
16     *U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing  
17     parties must “make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties  
18     need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud”). “While legal conclusions can  
19     provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual  
20     allegations.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679.

21              **III.**

22              **ARGUMENT**

23              **A. THE ACTION AGAINST THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS FAILS  
24              TO SATISFY RULE 8**

25              In order to satisfy Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement  
26      of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  
27      Each allegation in a complaint must also be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R.  
28      Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 “requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so

1 that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”  
2 *U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).

3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed  
4 dismissal on Rule 8 grounds where the complaint is “argumentative, prolix, replete  
5 with redundancy, and largely irrelevant,” *McHenry v. Renne*, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177,  
6 1180 (9th Cir. 1996), and where the complaint is “verbose, confusing and  
7 conclusory,” *Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.*, 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981).  
8 The rationale for such dismissals has been explained as follows:

9 Prolix, confusing complaints … impose unfair burdens on  
10 litigants and judges. As a practical matter, the judge and  
11 opposing counsel, in order to perform their responsibilities,  
12 cannot use [the] complaint … and must prepare outlines to  
13 determine who is being sued for what. Defendants are then  
14 put at risk that their outline differs from the judge’s, that  
plaintiffs will surprise them with something new at trial  
which they reasonably did not understand to be in the case  
at all, and that res judicata effects of settlement or judgment  
will be different from what they reasonably expected.

15 The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the  
‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated  
16 plaintiffs to submit. He then must manage the litigation  
without knowing what claims are made against whom. This  
17 leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials, prejudicing  
litigants in other case[s] who follow the rules, as well as  
18 defendants in the case in which the prolix pleading is filed.  
*McHenry*, 84 F.3d at 1179-80.

19 The FAC contains anything but “a short and plain statement” of each claim, or  
20 “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). Rather,  
21 as noted above, the FAC spans 100 pages and contains 500 paragraphs. (Dkt. No.  
22 15.) The averments in the FAC are also argumentative, confusing, and almost entirely  
23 conclusory. While the FAC alleges widespread racism and bias involving the Judicial  
24 Defendants spanning multiple lawsuits and courts, it is impossible to determine from  
25 the FAC the manner in which each defendant participated in this alleged conspiracy  
26 against Kamath. Indeed, the Judicial Defendants are lumped together with multiple  
27 other defendants and are alleged to have participated in Kamath’s conspiracies in an  
28 entirely conclusory manner. Such allegations fail to satisfy Rule 8.

1                   **B. THE ACTION AGAINST JUSTICES ASHMAN-GERST, LUI,**  
2                   **AND STRATTON, JUDGES MEIERS, SHULTZ, TREU, AND**  
3                   **STEWART, THE SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, THE**  
4                   **SUPERIOR COURT, AND JCC IS FORECLOSED BY JUDICIAL**  
5                   **IMMUNITY**

6                   It is well-settled that judges are granted absolute immunity from civil liability  
7                   for their judicial actions. *Lund v. Cowan*, 5 F.4th 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2021); *Duvall v.*  
8                   *County of Kitsap*, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001); *Ashelman v. Pope*, 793 F.2d  
9                   1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); *Regan v. Price*, 131 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1495  
10                  (Ct. App. 2005); *Soliz v. Williams*, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 585-586 (Ct. App. 1999);  
11                  *Howard v. Drapkin*, 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 (Ct. App. 1990). “This absolute  
12                  immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even  
13                  when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives,  
14                  [citation], or when the exercise of judicial authority is ‘flawed by the commission of  
15                  grave procedural errors.’” *In re Castillo*, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting  
16                  *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)). “Judicial immunity applies however  
17                  erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may  
18                  have proved to the plaintiff.” *Ashelman*, 793 F.2d at 1075 (internal quotation marks  
19                  omitted). “Disagreement with the action taken by [a] judge,” even one resulting in  
20                  “tragic consequences,” “does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity.”  
21                  *Stump*, 435 U.S. at 363 (applying judicial immunity to judge who approved petition  
22                  for sterilization even if approval was in error).

23                  Judicial immunity is only overcome if the actions were “nonjudicial actions,  
24                  i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” or were “actions, though  
25                  judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” *Mireles v. Waco*,  
26                  502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Regarding the  
27                  former, “[a]n act is considered ‘judicial’ when it is a function normally performed by  
28                  a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” *Sidiakina v.*  
29                  *Bertoli*, No. C 10-03157 JSW, 2012 WL 12850130, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2012)  
30                  (citing *Stump*, 435 U.S. at 362).

1       Here, the claims against the Judicial Defendants (except Deputy Clerk Real  
2 who enjoys quasi-judicial immunity as set forth *infra*) unequivocally arise from  
3 judicial acts. Starting with Justices Ashmann-Gerst and Lui, the FAC complains  
4 about comments they made with regard to Kamath and her conduct in the Court of  
5 Appeal. The FAC alleges they “used words like ‘conspiracies’ in describing  
6 [Kamath][,]” referred to Kamath’s comments about Justice Lui and the judiciary as  
7 “insulting,” “inflammatory,” and “unfounded,” described conduct of Kamath as  
8 “slow” and “delayed,” “called [Kamath] ‘dense,’” and incorrectly stated Kamath was  
9 on vacation when a filing was due. (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 158, 159, 163, 165, 173); *see also*  
10 *Schwartzman*, 2023 WL 7969843, at \*11 (referring to Kamath’s “conspiracies of  
11 personal persecution[”]); *Czech*, 2023 WL 7968410, at \*4 (labeling Kamath’s  
12 remarks about the judiciary and Justice Lui as “unfounded, outrageous, offensive,  
13 and insulting” and “inflammatory”); *Id.* at \*5 (describing Kamath’s misconduct as  
14 including “unreasonably delay[ing] in sharing the appellate record in violation of [the  
15 California Rules of Court]”). The FAC further avers that Justice Stratton used the  
16 words “insulting,” “inflammatory,” and “unfounded” to describe Kamath’s  
17 comments in a ruling in another appeal. (*Id.* ¶ 178.)

18       As to Judge Meiers, who presided over *Schwartzman* in the trial court, the FAC  
19 alleges “[she] demonstrated her racism for over a year constantly berating [Kamath] –  
20 acting extremely abusive and demeaning – [and] causing White attorneys extreme[]  
21 latitude.” (*Id.* ¶ 187); *see also Schwartzman*, 2023 WL 7969843 at \*3 (detailing in-  
22 court exchange between Judge Meiers and Kamath). The FAC further avers that  
23 Judge Stewart told Kamath in another matter, “Shut up[,] shut your mouth,” and  
24 ordered Kamath to appear in-person to apologize to the court. (*Id.* ¶¶ 57, 61.)  
25 Regarding Judge Shultz, the FAC alleges “he was ‘furious’ and made contemptuous  
26 orders[]” with regard to Kamath in another action, including striking a substitution  
27 of attorney form filed by Kamath. (*Id.* ¶¶ 70, 74.) Finally, in yet another unspecified  
28 action, the FAC avers Judge Treu ignored the alleged untimeliness of an anti-SLAPP

1 motion and “rule[d] on the [motion] in favor of all-White cross-defendants ....” (*Id.*  
2 ¶¶ 414, 447, 465, 493.)

3 It is well-settled that court orders and decisions are ordinary judicial functions  
4 protected by judicial immunity. *Duvall*, 260 F.3d at 1133 (“Ruling on a motion is a  
5 normal judicial function[.]”); *Ray, Jr. v. Bruiniers*, No. C 10-824 SI (pr), 2010 WL  
6 3448320, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2010) (“Deciding an appeal and writing an opinion  
7 announcing the decision are judicial acts squarely within the jurisdiction of a state  
8 appellate judge.”). The Ninth Circuit has also expressly held that “[a judge’s] in-court  
9 statement easily falls within the purview of a judicial act.” *Lund*, 5 F.4th at 972.  
10 Indeed, “judicial immunity shields even incorrect or inappropriate statements if they  
11 were made during the performance of a judge’s official duties.” *Id.*

12 Based on the foregoing, Justices Ashmann-Gerst, Lui, and Stratton, and Judges  
13 Meiers, Stewart, Shultz, and Treu, are absolutely immune from liability in this action.  
14 Insofar as the claims against the Superior Court, Second Appellate District, and JCC  
15 are based on the judicial acts of the individual justices and judges, such immunity  
16 also forecloses Kamath’s claims against those entities. *Id.* (affirming dismissal of  
17 claim against superior court based on judicial immunity of superior court judge); *Reis*  
18 *v. D’Braunstein*, No. SA CV 08-0754-AG (ANx), 2008 WL 11342704, at \*2 (C.D.  
19 Cal. Dec. 15, 2008) (holding “the broad doctrine of judicial immunity” covers the  
20 Superior Court of California for actions taken by its judges). Kamath’s claims against  
21 the Judicial Defendants (except Deputy Clerk Real) are therefore barred by judicial  
22 immunity and should be dismissed.

23 **C. THE ACTION AGAINST DEPUTY CLERK REAL IS BARRED  
24 BY QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY**

25 “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil  
26 rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial  
27 process.” *Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court*, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.  
28 1987) (applying quasi-judicial immunity where clerks accepted and filed incomplete

1 bankruptcy petition and later refused to accept amended petition); *see also Moore v.*  
2 *Brewster*, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on other  
3 grounds) (applying immunity where clerk deceived plaintiff regarding the status of  
4 supersedeas bond and improperly conducted hearings to assess costs against  
5 plaintiff); *Morrison v. Jones*, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying quasi-  
6 judicial immunity where clerk failed to provide notice of court order). The Ninth  
7 Circuit has also “extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity ... to court clerks and  
8 other non-judicial officers for purely administrative acts – acts which taken out of  
9 context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are actually a part of  
10 the judicial function.” *Castillo*, 297 F.3d at 952 (applying absolute quasi-judicial  
11 immunity a failure to provide notice of a hearing and mismanagement of a court's  
12 docket because such actions are a part of the judicial function).

13 Here, the FAC complains about Deputy Clerk Real rejecting filings from  
14 Kamath while accepting filings from “White Attorneys,” failing to include Kamath’s  
15 filings on the register of actions, delaying the entry of a default “for a White  
16 attorney[,]” providing legal advice, citing statutory codes, and communicating ex  
17 parte with Kamath. (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 141-142, 144-150, 153-155; *see also* Request for  
18 Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A at 4 [10/17/23 Entry]; RJN, Ex. C at 4 [6/27/23  
19 Entry].) The management of the Court of Appeal’s docket and processing court  
20 filings are indisputably an integral part of the judicial process. *Castillo*, 297 F.3d at  
21 951; *Mullis*, 828 F.2d at 1390; *see also Bettencourt v. McCabe*, No. 1:17-CV-00646-  
22 DAD-SAB, 2017 WL 4180979, at \*5 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2017) (court clerks’  
23 determination of “what documents should be filed and what documents should be  
24 returned to the filer because of deficiencies ... [is] integral part[] of the judicial  
25 process that involve[s] the exercise of discretionary judgment”); *Coulter v. Murrell*,  
26 No. 10cv102-IEG(NLS), 2011 WL 13208995, at \*1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011), *aff’d*,  
27 463 Fed. Appx. 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (quasi-judicial immunity barred Section 1983  
28 claim alleging denial of right to access to courts because “[t]he processing of

1 documents submitted to the Clerk for filing is an integral part of the judicial  
2 process”). The action against Deputy Clerk Real is therefore barred by the doctrine  
3 of quasi-judicial immunity.

4 **D. THE ACTION AGAINST THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS IS  
5 ALSO PRECLUDED BY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT**

6 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages, injunctive relief, and  
7 declaratory relief against “a state, an ‘arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its  
8 agencies.” *Franceschi v. Schwartz*, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995); *Greater Los  
9 Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin*, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). Not  
10 only are the JCC and California courts deemed state agencies for purposes of the  
11 Eleventh Amendment, *Wolfe v. Strankman*, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004)  
12 (overruled on other grounds by *Munoz v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County*, 91  
13 F.4th 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2024)); *Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court*,  
14 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); *Zolin*, 812 F.2d at 1110, but the Eleventh  
15 Amendment also extends to claims against state court judges and employees in their  
16 official capacities, as they are considered arms of the state, *Lund*, 5 F.4th at 969;  
17 *Simmons*, 318 F.3d at 1161.

18 Here, the FAC seeks damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief  
19 concerning the lawfulness of past actions taken by the individual Judicial Defendants  
20 in their official capacities (i.e., Justices Ashmann-Gerst, Lui, and Stratton, and Judges  
21 Meiers, Stewart, Shultz, and Treu), and requests identical relief against the entity  
22 Judicial Defendants (i.e., the Superior Court, Second Appellate District, and JCC)  
23 based on the same or related conduct. Such claims are unequivocally precluded by  
24 the Eleventh Amendment.

25 **E. THE ACTION AGAINST THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS ALSO  
26 RUNS AFOUL OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE**

27 “Under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, ‘a state-court decision is not reviewable  
28 by lower federal courts.’” *Hooper v. Brnovich*, 56 F.4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022)

1 (quoting *Skinner v. Switzer*, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011)). In *Hooper*, the plaintiff had  
2 unsuccessfully moved in state court for an order permitting him to conduct DNA and  
3 fingerprint analysis on a crime scene. 56 F.4th at 621. The plaintiff thereafter filed a  
4 lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court seeking a “declaratory judgment that  
5 the [state] statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are  
6 unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to  
7 permit him to conduct the forensic testing.” *Id.* at 621-22. The Ninth Circuit held that  
8 the federal district court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-*  
9 *Feldman* doctrine because th[e] action amounted to an improper appeal of the state  
10 courts’ judgment.” *Ibid.*

11 The Ninth Circuit observed that *Rooker-Feldman* bars lower federal courts  
12 from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought as a direct appeal  
13 as well as a “‘de facto equivalent’ of such appeal.” *Id.* at 624 (quoting *Morrison v.*  
14 *Peterson*, 809 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2015)). “To determine whether an action  
15 functions as a de facto appeal, [a court should] ‘pay close attention to the *relief* sought  
16 by the federal-court plaintiff.’” *Ibid.* (quoting *Cooper v. Ramos*, 704 F.3d 772, 777-  
17 78 (9th Cir. 2012)) (emphasis in original). A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction  
18 under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine when the federal court plaintiff “complains of a  
19 legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the  
20 judgment of that court.” *Noel v. Hall*, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003).

21 Where a plaintiff files a claim in federal court alleging an erroneous ruling by a  
22 state court, “the jurisdictional inquiry hinges on whether the constitutional claims  
23 presented to the district court ‘are *inextricably intertwined* with the state court’s  
24 [ruling].’” *Hooper*, 56 F.4th at 624 (quoting *Cooper*, 704 F.3d at 778) (emphasis in  
25 original). “Claims are inextricably intertwined if ‘the relief requested in the federal  
26 action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.’” *Id.* at  
27 624-25 (quoting *Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana*, 307 F.3d 987, 992  
28 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Because the plaintiff in *Hooper* sought an order from the federal district court stating that he was entitled to the DNA testing, the Ninth Circuit found that his requested relief “would effectively reverse the state courts’ decision that he is not entitled to the test.” *Hooper*, 56 F.4th at 625. It was a “pure horizontal appeal of the state court’s decision,” and essentially amounted to an argument that “the state courts decided his case incorrectly.” *Id.*

Similar to *Hooper*, the Judicial Defendants are alleged to have committed errors in multiple state court actions. These errors include, but are not limited to, using language to which Kamath takes exception, issuing adverse rulings against Kamath, and rejecting court filings. (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 57, 61, 70, 74, 141-142, 144-150, 153-155, 158, 159, 163, 165, 173, 178, 187, 414, 447, 465, 493.) The FAC also seeks relief from these purportedly erroneous acts by asking for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against the Judicial Defendants. (*Id.* Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-3.)

Because Kamath is complaining of allegedly erroneous conduct that occurred in state court, and she seeks relief therefrom, the instant action is a forbidden de facto appeal under *Rooker-Feldman*. This action also runs afoul of *Rooker-Feldman* because the granting of the requested relief would undercut the rulings rendered by the Judicial Defendants in state court. Kamath’s action is therefore barred by the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine.

**F. THE STATE LAW DAMAGES CLAIMS FAIL DUE TO KAMATH’S FAILURE TO ALLEGE COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA’S GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ACT**

Finally, California’s Government Claims Act mandates the filing of a claim as a condition precedent to bringing a suit for “money or damages” against a judicial branch defendant. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 811.9, 900.3, 905.7, 915(c)(1); 945.4; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.201. “A suit for ‘money or damages’ includes all actions where the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless of whether the action is founded in ‘tort, contract or some other theory.’” *Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd.*, 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 383 (Ct. App. 2004).

1        “The timely filing of a claim is an essential element of a cause of action against  
2 a public entity ....” *Wood v. Riverside Gen. Hosp.*, 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 (Ct.  
3 App. 1994); *see also State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde)*, 32 Cal.4th 1234,  
4 1240 (Ct. App. 2004); *Del Real v. City of Riverside*, 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767-68 (Ct.  
5 App. 2002). The “failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public  
6 entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” *City of Stockton v.*  
7 *Superior Court*, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting *Bodde*, 32 Cal.4th at  
8 1239); Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4.

9        The failure to present a government claim to a judicial branch defendant also  
10 bars suit against any judicial branch employee who allegedly caused the injury. Cal.  
11 Gov. Code § 950.2; *Mazzola v. Feinstein*, 154 Cal.App.3d 305, 310 (Ct. App. 1984)  
12 (“It is settled that the filing of a timely claim against the employing public entity is a  
13 condition precedent to a tort action against either the public entity or the employee.”).

14        As noted above, the FAC prays for damages in excess of \$100 million. (Dkt.  
15 No. 15, Prayer for Relief ¶ 1.) Absent from the FAC, however, is any allegation that  
16 Kamath presented a government claim. Given presentation of a government claim is  
17 “an essential element of a cause of action against a public entity ...[,]” *Wood*, 25  
18 Cal.App.4th at 1119, the state law damages claims against the Judicial Defendants  
19 fail as a matter of law.

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IV.

## **CONCLUSION**

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Judicial Defendants' motion to dismiss. Because the deficiencies in the FAC are fatal and cannot be cured by further amendment, the action against them should be dismissed without leave to amend. *Thinket Ink Info Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.*, 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (denial of leave to amend proper where amendment would be futile).

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